It all began on May 7 when the Indian Air Force conducted a series of air strikes targeting locations in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. This offensive was code-named Operation Sindoor. The military aggression was triggered by a deadly attack on tourists in Pahalgam, Kashmir, on April 22, which resulted in the deaths of twenty-six civilians.

Indian officials asserted that the operations were aimed at nine sites identified as “terrorist infrastructure.” In response, the Pakistani military contended that the strikes targeted only six sites, resulting in the loss of thirty-one civilian lives. On the Indian side, reports indicate that at least forty civilians were killed and many injured, primarily in Jammu’s Poonch sector, as Pakistani troops engaged in heavy shelling across the Line of Control (LoC) in retaliation for the Indian attack.

The Pahalgam incident proved advantageous for Modi, whose administration was already struggling with various issues. The Indian government faced significant public dissent, particularly regarding the controversial Waqf (Amendment) Act, as well as Supreme Court rulings that highlighted constitutional violations by the administration. Additionally, economic challenges and rising unemployment contributed to the growing discontent. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s decision to impose tariffs on India introduced further uncertainties.

Instead of taking responsibility for the serious security lapses that contributed to the tragic incident in Pahalgam, Modi and his allies exploited the situation to incite panic, frenzy, war hysteria, jingoism, and a new wave of Islamophobia. They managed to galvanize an entire nation around a perceived security threat posed by Pakistan-backed terrorists. Almost the entire nation rallied behind them in their quest for retribution following the attack.

Major media channels facilitated this situation by propagating new falsehoods about Pakistan on a daily basis. These media outlets transformed into battlegrounds, inflaming millions of citizens across the country with misinformation. The government even had to intervene on May 9 to stop the media from disseminating false information and stirring up animosity.

The Modi government has intentionally orchestrated this climate to enhance its popularity, especially in the lead-up to the state assembly elections in Bihar. It also serves to divert the attention of India’s working masses from material issues facing the country, such as rising unemployment, inequality, poverty, and various forms of deprivation. Reports indicate that the youth unemployment rate rose to 16.1 percent in the first quarter of 2025.

The social media account of the Indian military’s public information unit lauded the cross-border strikes as a case of “justice served.” Yet there is no sign of the militants who were actually responsible for the terror attacks in Pahalgam being apprehended, while the “justice” of which the military speaks has involved lethal action directed at unarmed civilians, including children.

The timing of the Indian actions was perfect for the rulers of Pakistan. The country is grappling with severe economic and debt crises, political turmoil in Baluchistan, and a deteriorating relationship with Afghanistan, all of which have made the current government, led by Sharif and the military, unpopular with the people of the country.

The Pakistani response to the Pahalgam terror attack, both semi-officially and unofficially, was to claim that it was a “false flag operation.” An eruption of jingoistic war mania followed the incident.

Hectoring television anchors, much like their Indian counterparts, played a significant role in fostering war hysteria. Cabinet ministers, opposition politicians, and military leaders issued belligerent statements in unison. In the days leading up to the first Indian strikes, a prevailing sentiment in Pakistan emerged that India was retreating out of fear.

Two points deserve special mention for contextualizing the attitude in Pakistan. Firstly, the establishment has encouraged and protected jihadist outfits, at least in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Secondly, an impetuous Indian response objectively assisted Pakistan’s internally besieged hybrid regime, which has held power since the ouster of Imran Khan.

In this hybrid regime, the military calls the shots. The civilian government officials, Prime Minister Sharif and President Asif Ali Zardari, play the role of obedient servants to ensure their stint in power. Ayesha Siddiqa, a noted expert on Pakistan’s military, reported in February this year that “one knowledgeable source in Islamabad” believed that the military leadership was “getting ready to restart militancy — at a comparatively lower but noticeable scale” after the winter so as to pressure India into negotiating over Baluchistan.

Pakistan is facing an armed separatist movement in Baluchistan, which is geographically the largest of its four provinces, bordering Iran and Afghanistan. China has built a huge port in Gwadar on the Baluchistan coast, and Baluchistan is an important link in the Belt and Road Initiative. Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of arming and training the Baluchistan Liberation Army, a militant outfit responsible for guerrilla attacks on security installations and Chinese workers in Baluchistan.

Despite the chest-thumping and fanfare surrounding the purported war, along with widespread hysteria across the border, it is clear that neither of the two militaries has actually crossed into enemy territory. Missiles and drones were launched for cross-border shelling and attacks. The government and media in both countries celebrated with enormous enthusiasm each time their forces intercepted an “enemy” drone or missile within their respective borders.

According to a prominent Indian military specialist, Pravin Sawhney, the country was not even in a prewar situation, which typically involves the significant mobilization of ground forces across borders. What we witnessed was a military crisis — an intensified version of the usual incidents along the LoC, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.

India and Pakistan have fought three full-scale wars over Kashmir in the past, and both nations are nuclear-armed. Neither country can bear the cost of another full-fledged conflict. Pakistan’s economy is currently facing significant difficulties; it is deeply indebted and must repay numerous loans. With a sluggish economic growth rate of just over 2 percent, it cannot afford to become entangled in another major war.

Although India’s economy is considerably stronger and larger, Modi has held out the prospect of India becoming a $5 trillion economy and emerging as a major economic and geopolitical power. Any chance of achieving these goals relies on stability within India, and war with a nuclear-armed neighbor is unlikely to attract investors, not to mention the damage to tourism that would result. We have already witnessed flight cancellations in both countries, and it is not in either nation’s strategic or economic interest for the recent tensions to escalate into something more severe.

Additionally, India understands that the Chinese are unlikely to remain passive in the event of an attack on Pakistan. This is not solely due to traditional Indo–Chinese hostilities; it is also because China has invested approximately $62 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This investment encompasses a broad array of infrastructure and energy projects designed to connect China’s western region to Gwadar Port in Pakistan.

The Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea are significant for the Belt and Road Initiative. China would be deeply concerned if the belligerent actions of what it perceives as irresponsible governments in these two nations ended up jeopardizing its investments. Involving the Chinese in a conflict could prove disastrous for India, as modern warfare relies heavily on advanced technology, where China possess a considerable advantage.

It is therefore in the best interests of India and Pakistan alike to maintain low-intensity military actions, as this strategy provides them with significant political advantages at a minimal cost. However, this approach imposes a heavy burden on their civilian populations. Following the initial euphoria after the attacks, when Pakistan indicated that it would retaliate, the atmosphere in India — particularly in the northern and western regions — shifted from celebration to panic and apprehension about potential casualties.

While Indian capitalists may have initially supported the war fervor, the subsequent closure of airports and diversion of flights caused them considerable alarm. The Indian industrial sector has since issued statements calling for restraint. On May 9, Indian stock markets and the rupee suffered a notable drop before regaining lost ground on May 12 with the cease-fire agreement.

Both parties were seeking to de-escalate following the initial displays of aggression, awaiting the right moment to appease their domestic audiences. A viable method for doing so involved being able to cite international pressure.

While China maintains a close relationship with Pakistan, its sway over India is limited. The Gulf states have some influence over both nations, but not as much as the United States. Countries like Russia and Iran could potentially mediate and help prevent the situation from escalating into a more severe crisis; however, their leverage would not be sufficient to stave off further tensions.

As things stand, the only power that India and Pakistan both feel compelled to heed is the United States. Historically, the United States has played a role in facilitating peace between the two states. Following the start of Indian military actions, there were signs that Washington was indirectly shaping India’s actions and communications, as it stressed the “focused, measured, and non-escalatory” nature of the strikes, designed to meet Donald Trump’s expectations.

Trump has asserted that the United States facilitated a series of discussions that culminated in an agreement; the Indian government neither confirmed nor denied this claim. To bolster his supporters and maintain a sense of war fervor, Modi adopted a defiant and triumphant tone in an address to the nation on May 12.

He proclaimed that India had established a “new normal” for responding to terrorist attacks, and presented the cease-fire as a temporary suspension of operations from the Indian side, with a close watch to be kept on Pakistan’s actions over the coming days. The response of the Pakistani establishment was equally bellicose.

While the cease-fire has halted armed operations, verbal and diplomatic assaults have continued. There has been no reversal to date of the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, not to mention the halting of visas, the expulsion of diplomats, the closing of borders, the restriction of airspace, and the suspension of trade. Ultimately, it is the common people of both countries, along with the Kashmiris on either side of the border, who have been most affected and who remain hostages to this ongoing crisis.